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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Electricity is the key element for human development
on earth. Therefore, to meet the demand of increasing
electricity generation, it is essential to enhance the
capacity of pollution free nuclear energy along with
other available energy sources. India has the total
installed capacity of 6780 MWe of Nuclear Power as
as on date and around 15700 MWe is being planned to
installed in future by 2031 with commissioning more
nuclear reactors which including the ones under
construction/planning stage.
Currently about 454 nuclear reactors are
operating all over the world and the nuclear power
contributes to over 11% of total electricity produced
globally.[1] In view of the fast depleting fossil fuels
(coal, oil etc.) reserves and need of clean and green
source of energy, nuclear power looks to be highly
attractive option, which is free from SOx, NOx, COx
gases that is released in conventional fossil fuel based
power plants. The nuclear power technology has
developed and matured as a safe, clean and efficient
means of electricity generation for meeting the global
expanding energy needs.  However, the public
understanding and acceptability of nuclear power
earlier remained shrouded in myths and fears quite
disproportionate to the scientific facts for the last four
decades following Three miles, Chernobyl and
Fukushima severe accidents. Following the
demonstration of the safe nuclear power technology
severe accident management and the understanding of
the hazards emanating from the natural events, the
public is now accepting the nuclear energy generation
for societal benefits and is now aware that the risk
associated with radiation from Nuclear Power Plants
is minimal due to the restricted and acceptable
releases, which at present are extremely low and
comparable to the natural background radiation levels.
However, it is recognized that excess exposure to
radiation could lead to clinical damage in tissues of
human body and has potential for delayed induction of
malignancies. It is therefore very essential that
radiation exposure are strictly controlled during the
complete fuel cycle right from the transportation of
radioactive material including nuclear fuel to nuclear
reactors for power generation, in-core fuel
management, including online refueling, to run the
nuclear power station, disposal of generated
radioactive waste so as to limit the exposure for
occupational workers as well as to the public. All these
activities are performed as per guidelines and safety
standards set by International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) as recorded in various IAEA guides.
Looking into the large years of experience of nuclear
power across the world vis a vis the overall fuel
management in the complete nuclear fuel cycle, it is
important to review the Linear-No-Threshold (LNT)
principle in a scientific manner. LNT principle based
on linear interpolation from data collected at very high
radiation levels of radiation exposure resulted into the
myth that that any insignificant amount of radiation
exposure howsoever small can affect the human body
is cause for the deeply rooted fear of radiation in public
mind. This has enormous political, economic, social
and psychological impact on nuclear industry and the
scientific measures have been initiated to address this
problem. Meanwhile it is prudent that a systematic
study be undertaken to examine the impact associated
with the generation of nuclear power resulting from a
number of processes and operations involved in the
complete nuclear fuel cycle, which has been addressed
in the paper. [1]
2.0 MINING, MILLING and FUEL
FABRICATION
Uranium ores are found in many parts of the world but
with different varying percentage of uranium up to 2%
mainly in form of oxide minerals.  Since medium
grade ores contain large amount of inert material, a
concentration operation is needed in a mill located
close to the mining area. Typical operations utilize
either chemical leaching or solvent extraction process.
The product is known as yellow cake which contains
around 80% U3O8. This yellow cake is then
transported to a central purification facility where
further chemical operations are carried out to remove
impurities and produce nuclear grade uranium dioxide
or uranium hexafluoride for   subsequent use in fuel
fabrication.
Waste from mining and milling activities contain very
low concentrations of radioactive material. The long-
lived radionuclides include Ra-226 and Rn-222 and
this has important implications for its management.
Rainfall and snowmelt runoff and seepage from
stockpiles and areas of uranium process plants are well
managed and the releases are extremely below the
acceptable levels. The waste rocks produced in mining
are used for backfill of mines and the construction of
embankments on the mine site etc. Mine-water is as
far as possible usually recycled back in the mine and
the mill.
The operators of the mine and mill have a
comprehensive radiological protection program. The
design of tailings pile has a feature that incorporate
multilevel barrier for minimizing the migration of
contaminants.  To achieve optimization in radiological
protection, principle of As Low as Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA) is used with social and
economic factors being taken into account. [2]
During fuel fabrication especially with enriched
uranium accidental aggregation of fuel may lead to
chain reaction though very improbable but great care
in material handling is taken to avoid any such
possibility. The presence of toxic Fluorine in
fabrication requires a greater care and procedures at
this stage. However, the production of UO2 elements
is now a well-established and almost free from
hazards. [3]
With all the controls in place the annual effective
annual dose has been less than 5.5mSv in a five year
study whereas the AERB limits is 20mSv per year.
The annual exposure is estimated to be 1.7 to 3.1 mSv
with a mean of 2.49mSv per annum to the members of
public and around 65% of the world population
receive an annual dose of 1-3mSv p.a. All these doses
have been very small as compare the doses of very
high natural background in many parts of the world
like Ramsar in Iran reach >400mSv/year and Brazil up
to 700mSv/year. No harmful effects has been observed
in high natural background areas [1], which again calls
for a detailed scientific evaluation of LNT principle.
3.0 NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT in
OPERATION of NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
and ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
The most important contaminants from fossil-fueled
power plant operation are carbon dioxide, sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particulate matter. The
combustion process contributes about 10 % of the
carbon dioxide emitted to the atmosphere, the
remainder being primarily the result of natural decay.
Increasing Carbon dioxide levels in atmosphere can
affect the earth’s climate as a result of the greenhouse
effect. Other gases act as pollutants to the ecosystem
and lead to acid rain.
Power generation from nuclear fission of Uranium,
which is a nuclear reaction and does not involve any
combustion process and therefore CO2 and other
pollutants unlike a fossil power plant, are not
generated.   However, due to operation of a Nuclear
reactor a large number of radioactive fission and
activation products are produced which if not
contained and managed may pose threat to the
environment. In order to contain and restrict the
emissions of radiation and radiation sources, a
Defense-In-Depth approach is used by Nuclear Power
operators both philosophically and its implementation
physically. This means that if there is one barrier to
control radiation release is breached; it is backed up by
second barrier and so on; for example in PHWRs –
First barrier is UO2 fuel matrix itself, second barrier is
Zircaloy cladding of fuel; third barrier is Pressure tube,
Fourth barrier is Primary containment, Fifth barrier is
Secondary containment and sixth barrier is exclusion
boundary of the reactor. The approach encompasses
accident prevention, control of abnormal operation,
detection of fuel failures and the mitigation in
exigencies. Prevention is achieved philosophically by
employing various technical and administrative
controls and the target is to prevent any incident
initiation for prevention of accident and provision of
mitigation measures in case of an accident. The next
layer involves various countermeasures in sequential
manner to control the incident of radioactive release.
In this defense-in-depth approach, various physical
barriers mentioned above for confinement of radiation
and fission products, are enforced.
The fuel has operating power limits beyond which
higher amount of volatile fission products especially
noble gases(Xe133, halogens etc. may be produced
and this can lead to fuel pellet clad interaction under
pressure/temperature condition and may damage the
cladding. Iodine-131, one of the fission products, is
monitored in coolant heavy water routinely every day
to check such a breach. With the online refueling, it is
possible to remove the defective fuel from the core by
refueling individual channel while the reactor is in
operation.
In Indian PHWRs, the fuel is loaded in the core in the
form of Natural Uranium dioxide in fuel bundles,
which has either 19 element pencils or 37 element
pencils, depending on the rating of the reactor.
Uranium dioxide pellets are stacked in each pencil and
encapsulated in zircalloy-4 tube. To replenish the fuel
material inside the reactor core, online refueling
system on both sides of the reactor exists. During the
operation of reactor and during refueling the integrity
of various systems is ensured like fuel pencils,
cladding, pressure tubes, Calandria vessel housing of
the reactor core etc. The fuel has operating power
limits (483KW for 220MWe, beyond which higher
amount of volatile fission products may be produced
and this could lead to fuel pellet clad interaction under
pressure/temperature and may damage the cladding.
If this situation arises, the breach in Zircaloy cladding
can occur and the fission product may come out of fuel
to heavy water coolant in the pressure tubes.Iodine-
131, one of the fission products, is monitored in
coolant heavy water routinely every day to check such
a breach. With online refueling is possible it is possible
to remove the defective fuel from the core by refueling
individual channel while the reactor is operating.  So
the main job remains is to identify the channel
containing the defective fuel. This is done by trending
I-131 in coolant. Normally this Iodine-131
concentration is less than 2µCi/l and if this
concentration increases beyond 10 µCi/lit it becomes
imperative that there is a presence of defective/failed
fuel inside the core and it should be removed.  Apart
from fission neutrons there are delayed neutrons
present in the core and their concentration ranges up to
0.65% of total neutrons. These neutrons are emitted
from fission product precursors like Br-87 and I-137
with half lives of 55 sec and 22 sec respectively. These
neutrons are being measured for Delayed neutron
counts in BF3 filled detector with sensitivity of around
4cps/nv (count per second per unit flux) to estimate the
change in their population.  Whenever there is a
defective fuel the corresponding detector reads higher
than normal and out of large number of channels in the
operating reactor core, the defective bundle/channel is
identified using Delayed Neutron (DN) monitoring
technique to pin point the location of failure. In this,
the variation in the delayed neutron counts from
different channels is observed and the data is analyzed
for 99% confidence level. Fuel channels showing DN
ratios beyond 1± 3σ are trended to ascertain the fact of
existence of cladding breach.   Individual channel is
monitored during refueling and when the failed fuel
passes through various neutron flux locations while
travelling through the core gives an idea of the
individual bundle pair having the failed fuel. This
ensures to restrict any radiation release beyond the
closed loop of Primary Heat Transport system at all
times. If the I-131 increases without removal of
defective fuel inside core, the reactor is shut-down till
defective fuel is removed to restrict any possible
environmental effects.
Improvements based on lessons learnt in fuel design,
such as graphite coating, use of split spacer design etc.,
has been incorporated. Further before transporting fuel
to reactor site, 100 % fuel bundles undergo quality
assurance check for Helium leak test. After receiving
the bundles at the reactor site, fuel bundles are
rechecked with helium leak test on statistical basis for
any manufacturing, visual defect etc., well before
loading in the reactor core. After loading the fuel in
the core, In-Core fuel management is done in such a
way that the regulatory safety limits on bundle
power(limiting conditions for operation at around 46
W/cm) do not exceed and fuel integrity is maintained.
Channels for refueling are selected based on the
average burn-up (consumption) of the fuel. The
channels showing design limit of the burn-up are
refueled, employing online bidirectional process. The
discharge Spent fuel bundles are kept under Spent Fuel
Storage Bay(SFSB) in a large pool of water for
cooling for a satisfactory short term storage but it
cannot be a permanent disposal facility. I131 is also
monitored routinely or health risks like child thyroid
and maintained under limits by purification system in
SFSB
The spent fuel in SFSB after cooling and decay of
short lived fission products are removed for
reprocessing in closed fuel cycle and this takes couple
of months. At reprocessing plant the fuel is chemically
treated by solvent extraction process and a portion of
residual fuel is recovered.  The gaseous and volatile
fission products Kr85, I129, tritium are released during
reprocessing. To maintain the emission standards the
release of these materials and the liquid and generated
solid waste is controlled by standard methods.
The discharge Spent fuel bundles are kept under pool
of water known as spent fuel bay for cooling. I131 is
also monitored routinely and maintained under limits
by purification system in spent fuel bay and normally
SFSB iodine is maintained below 1 µCi/lt. The
purification is through Ion exchange columns which
has both Cation and anion resins to remove iodine
radioactivity. Further, the PH of spent fuel bay is
maintained basic at around 8.5 by adding chemicals
like LiOH and hydrazine, which further help in
trapping Iodine. Air ventilation recirculation of spent
fuel bay is maintained through activated charcoal filter
to ensure the discharges at Below Detectable Level
(BDL).  Whenever a defective fuel is refueled, the
bundle is kept in the fueling machine magazine under
purification flow through IX columns till iodine
discharges from the fuel bundle comes down to
acceptable level wherein it can be safely discharged to
spent fuel storage bay. The used exhausted resins from
IX- columns are radioactive waste and are stored in
waste management facility in concrete canisters after
vitrification.
During this route, there is no chance of any radiation
release to the environment. Now this spent fuel after
cooling for six months by which the short half- life
radioactive elements decay completely, the fuel is
transported for reprocessing. After reprocessing the
long-lived radioactive element remain in the
radioactive waste and the waste is disposed in
repositories in concrete canisters after vitrification.
Thus, the entire in-core nuclear fuel cycle till
reprocessing ensures minimal release of radiation to
environment and is well below within the acceptable
limits.
It may be observed that compared to the average
background radiation level of 2400µSv/yr and further
the limit set by Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board (AERB) at 1000 µSv/yr is very conservative
because the actual releases from Indian Nuclear sites
is less than 5%  of the dose limit with all the above
measures during the nuclear power plant operation in
India. [4 &Fig1]
In Case there are inadvertent deviations in operation
of nuclear reactor either natural or induced, various
Engineered Safety Features(ESFs) are installed in
nuclear power plant to manage design basis accident
and response for bringing reactor under safe shut-
down condition while maintaining the desired safe
status of reactor. For situations like Design Extension
Conditions that are very improbable, Severe Accident
Guidelines are issued to mitigate the situation and
limit the radiation releases in public domain.
Further, as a part of nuclear industry safety culture the
lessons learnt from any of the events in a nuclear
power plant are being shared globally and appropriate
measures are implemented for both forward fit and
retrofit. This has tremendous effect on the sturdiness
of nuclear power reactor throughout the world for
maintaining an accident free/limited manageable
accidents track record of nuclear power industry.
4.0 SPENT FUEL TRANSPORTATION
Security and safety is maintained while transporting
the spent fuel bundles for reprocessing. The bundles
are kept in air cooled Lead Flask to ensure that
radiation limits outside the flasks are maintained
within acceptable regulatory guidelines. This flask is
transported on a long trailer escorted with proper
security cover and procedures and under the leadership
of a Radiation Safety officer in an emergency vehicle
fitted with radiation monitors. The speed of the convoy
is limited and travels only in day time. During night
time the convoy is halted under police cover and
concerned state authorities and regulatory bodies are
well informed.
If there is any accidental fall of the flask on the road
due to any exigency, the area around the flask is
cordoned with display radiation symbol around for
alert and traffic is diverted till problem is rectified
Spent fuel from Indian PHWRs are kept in air-cooled
Lead flask to ensure that radiation limits outside the
flasks remain within acceptable regulatory guidelines.
.  It is ensured in design of the flask that no inadvertent
criticality would occur during transportation.
Packaging and Transport of radioactive materials are
regulated by international as well as National transport
regulations published by IAEA for the safe transport
of radioactive materials
5.0 ROLE of NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
In the entire fuel cycle whether front end or back end
strict vigilance and care is required both at the  national
and international levels to ensure that nuclear material
remains with the authorized agencies. To achieve this
Nuclear Material Accounting (NUMAC) and Nuclear
Security Procedures like Physical Protection systems
etc.  have to be placed in the correct perspective. In
India, it is ensured by IAEA safeguarded system for
the facilities covered under International IAEA
Safeguards as per the agreement with IAEA and rest
nuclear facilities are ensured by Domestic
Safeguarded system.
6.0 THE CASE OF ACCIDENTS
The three accidents in Nuclear History viz Three mile
island(1979-USA),Chernobyl-1986(Former USSR),
Fukushima(2011-Japan) have been widely studied and
analyzed and led to large improvements in operations
and safety culture of a nuclear power plants worldwide
as both forward fitting and backward fitting of the
lessons learnt has taken place. These improvements
have helped to bring back confidence in nuclear power
as safe source of energy. However the Fukushima
event which occurred in recent history due to multiple
units of nuclear reactor getting affected resulting from
natural events of earthquake and tsunami external to
the plant and occurred as beyond design basis. This
escalated to a level, which inducted severe damage
sequences, and consequently a large-scale evacuation
of people living in the vicinity was required. One of
the experiences gained is that there is a need to review
the impact of radiological event in public domain from
the psychological trauma on public due to large-scale
pre-emptive evacuation due to limitations in the
policies because of the foundation on Linear-No-
Threshold (LNT) [5, 6]
7.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
7.1 With a large number of technical and administrative
controls with Defense in Depth philosophy in design,
operation, maintenance and accident management, the
prescribed dose limits set by the regulatory authorities
are followed in a very conservative manner. Nuclear
power in upcoming years has to play a global role in
reducing GHGs emissions and meeting the targets of
COP conferences to limit the average rise of earth’s
temperature beyond 1.5 0C.
7.2 It is noted that during reactor operation and
complete nuclear fuel cycle there is a large margin
available between the dose limits set by regulatory
mechanism for public domain and the actual releases
and therefore all the concurrent safety principles should
be continued in practice. Further, in case of an extreme
event occurs in a nuclear power plant, implementation
of severe management guidelines should limit its
consequences. The target should be to avoid large-scale
relocation of people has been done as has been done in
the case of Fukushima (2011) accident that caused lot
of public trauma. In view of this it is imperative that
the present deficient policies based on inherently
limited Linear No Threshold (LNT) principle that ”No
Radiation is safe” should be reviewed on a scientific
basis rather than heuristically for management of an
accident in public domain and exposure limits should
be accordingly quantified which may be further
reviewed with the available data.
REFERENCES
1. ZBIGNIEW JAWOROWSKI, “Observations
on the Chernobyl disaster and LNT”,
International Dose Response Society (2010).
2. A. H. KHAN, S. K. BASU, V .N. JHA, R.
KUMAR, “Assessment of Environment
impact of mining and processing of uranium
ore at Jaduguda, India”, IAEA-SM-362/19.
3. ESSAM E. HINNAWI, “Review of the
Environmental Impact of Nuclear Energy”,
IAEA Bulletin-Vol.20, no.2.
4. NAVNIT MEHTA, A. R. LAKSHMANAN,
S. P. KATHURIA, and K. S. V. NAMBI.
“Environmental radiation levels around
Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad during
1981-1988”, (BARC-1477) India, (1989).
5. Anil Kakodkar, Ram Kumar Singh,
“Integrated safety assessment of Indian
Nuclear power plants for extreme events:
Reducing impact on public demand”,
Sadhana Vol38, Part-5, Indian Academy of
Sciences (2013)
6. “Interview: Dr. Edward Calabrese, “How a
‘Big Lie’ Launched the LNT Myth and The
Great Fear of Radiation”, 21st Century
Science & Technology, fall 2011.
Acknowledgements
The first author is sincerely thanks NPCIL, Mumbai
authorities especially Sh. A.S. Pradhan, Associate
Director for accessing the resources and Dr. A. Goel,
Director, AINST, AUUP, Noida for her







TAPS RAPS MAPS NAPS KAPS KGS DOSE
LIMITFigure 1. Typical values of Collective Radiation Dose in
Public Domain due to Indian Nuclear Power Plants
(µSv/yr). Average World Background is 2400µSv/yr
(Source: BARC Website)
